Hey folks, This is an RFC for a consensus-breaking change to the mining protocol in order to provide a minimum-bid PoX payout. If the aggregate PoX payout – defined as the sum of all block-commits’ payouts – does not meet a protocol-defined minimum value, then no sortition takes place in that Bitc…

Still two things I don’t understand about the Sybil attack miner. How it can be fixed other than organically having more mining competition The detailed mechanics of how it’s actually reducing BTC yield to stackers On point 1… [image] Metastack_BMC: Even if a new honest entity with 51% would…

[image] MattySTX: If, for example, 4 new honest miners entered with the same size, such that Sybil attack miner had <20% of total mining power, wouldn’t that prevent this behavior by making it effectively impossible? Isn’t that exactly how this is meant to be prevented? The problem here is th…

A bit of background. The behavior referred to by @Metastack_BMC and @yukan is consistent with someone running a white-glove mining service on behalf of multiple individuals. The BTC that funds the miners come from separate accounts, and the STX outflows go to separate accounts. Moreover, the node…

We should not conceal facts but openly discuss existing problems? [image] jude: The BTC that funds the miners come from separate accounts, and the STX outflows go to separate accounts. 1.) We provided a forensic snapshot last November which proved, that one BTC account funded > 80% of the mi…

[image] yukan: The problem here is that when the 4 new honest miners enter, their miner software is set up to naively trust all miners. Therefore it’s not sybil attack miner’s 20% against other miners’s 80%. Because all the honest miners will still confirm sybil attack miner’s blocks. Why is …

[image] Metastack_BMC: Even if a new honest entity with 51% would enter the field, with the standard 2.1 release they won´t be able to compete against the “bad” entity. Because as soon as the entity builds a longer fork, the honest miner would choose it to build the next block on it. I am als…

I hope these two examples (attached .png) help to understand the problem. In both cases the honest miners won ~56% of the sortitions but the bad entity earned more STX. The honest miners lost several block rewards (all orphaned blocks). A bad entity is able to ignore honest miners blocks as long as…

Apologies but this still doesn’t really address what I’m asking. Yes, I understand the miner ignoring previous blocks has an advantage, and this advantage is made exponentially worse as their share of collective mining power increases. [image] Metastack_BMC: The honest miners will build their b…

I suggest it’s about time to move on from the medium of a forum board to a community call with people like @jude who can help address these open questions. At least to me, it feels like we’re going in circles on the last few posts.

How about next Friday, using the SIP call with you Matty, could be a good space for it? Allocate enough time for presenting key findings from reports, and we can get into proper discussion and questions?

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RFC: Minimum-bid PoX (to thwart Bitcoin MEV)

Governance

request-for-feedback, sips

HeroGamer June 9, 2023, 1:02pm 71

Bitcoin MEV: Workstream Update Thread Core Blockchain

Dear all Stacks/Bitcoin community: To expand further “How you can help” in Pavitthra’s comment, in additional to joining the discussions of public calls, there are targeted questions core devs would like to know from the community if you have any thoughts/feedback: Q1. Which proposal, PCR or Smoothing, seems to adequately addresses the issue of miner extractable value? What improvements or changes would you suggest? Q2. You can evaluate the solutions on the basis of: does it adequately deter…

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