Still two things I don’t understand about the Sybil attack miner.
- How it can be fixed other than organically having more mining competition
- The detailed mechanics of how it’s actually reducing BTC yield to stackers
On point 1…
Isn’t the problem that the bad entity controls a sufficient amount of total mining power that even if other blocks get made, they can win a few blocks in a row and thus create a new longest chain?
If, for example, 4 new honest miners entered with the same size, such that Sybil attack miner had <20% of total mining power, wouldn’t that prevent this behavior by making it effectively impossible? Isn’t that exactly how this is meant to be prevented?
What, other than a lack of mining competition from the aggregate set of honest miners to begin with, is enabling the Sybil attacker to ignore previous blocks and create new longest chains?
On point 2…
Mechanically, how is the Sybil attacker lowering stacking yield?
Let’s say honest miner A wins STX block 100,000. They do so by sending native BTC to mine that block. In doing so, BTC yield has already been paid to the selected stacking addresses.
Now, the Sybil attack miner ignores miner A’s STX block of 100,000 (version A), and wins 2 vrfs in a row, which they use to build on block 99,999 and establish a new longest chain.
They overwrite/ignore honest miner A’s block, and propose Version B of block 100,000 and a new block 100,001. To do so, didn’t the Sybil miner also have to send BTC to stacking addresses?
Thus, I don’t see how this inherently reduces the BTC going to stacking addresses, except for if the Sybil miner can spend less than an average miner - but aren’t they only able to ignore previous blocks specifically because they’re spending more than other participants? Is the hypothesis that they are indirectly reducing stacking yield by stifling new mining competition and aggregate mining activity in general?