Introducing the Bitcoin Staking SIP v1 Draft

Hi all, a few updates

First, the 500 STX boost, we’ve reviewed the options for alternative funding of the coinbase boost based on your feedback, and have decided to eliminate the additional 500 STX boost in each block and just keep the long term adjustment of the coinbase reward back to 1000 STX.

In the case that we do end up wanting to do a boost at some point to help the growth of the program, it would be funded directly by the Endowment. Thanks to some suggestions plus insights from the core devs and the Endowment team, we were able to identify a way to handle the concept of the boost in a more targeted and on demand way by actually feeding sBTC directly into the PoX-5 contract as needed - allowing us to be conservative with the Endowment’s growth budget while still getting the boost if/when we need it.

Along these same lines and re the questions about dynamic issuance, we’ll use PoX 5 to gather data about this, but we are not going to propose including that for PoX 5 as we can handle a similar capability via the above mechanism without introducing the technical and economic complexity of actually building it into consensus.

The tentative timeline from here, based on the overall feedback from the community, we’re proceeding with formalizing this SIP proposal and adding to Github to begin the formal SIP process. The expected timeline now is

  • Jun 12 - Open Github PR with updated SIP draft

  • Jun 15 - Jun 29 - Review period for public, Editors, CABs + CAB Votes

  • Jul 1 - Jul 10 - Voting window (assuming CAB approval)

  • Jul 29 - Target hardfork date (assuming vote passes)

Most importantly though, before we open the PR, we’ve still got the community SIP office hours this Friday (link). Please join or share thoughts below this forum post if you have any remaining feedback or concerns. We’d appreciate talking this through directly before the PR is up (but of course more discussion and updates continue to happen through that process).

Thank you to everyone who dug into the draft and pushed on questions. The feedback on funding the boost directly shaped the changes above. We’re excited to move forward on Bitcoin Staking and start attracting more Bitcoin capital to the ecosystem.

5 Likes

Thank you for the feedback and update.

This is the best outcome I believe.

:raising_hands:

2 Likes

Great update! It’s awesome to see community feedback actually being included.

I wanted to add one thought about what really motivates STX miners. Do we know exactly how they operate and what their main incentive is?

Are they mining to:

A. Hold STX long-term because they think it has more upside than BTC?
B. Flip it immediately for a quick profit to grow their BTC bag?

If it’s B, what happens if mining profits drop below regular BTC staking yields? Wouldn’t these profit-driven miners just stop mining entirely and stake their BTC instead?

1 Like

So we should assume that miners mine above the btc yield, e.g. 5%. That should be considered in the maths

4 Likes

I wanted to share a quick piece of on-chain analysis regarding mining on the Stacks network and where those block rewards are ultimately heading.

Based on the data from jBTC, the undisputed top miner is currently this address: :backhand_index_pointing_right: SP30ZB6GC6D95BF9QV9CB43TZCAJ70SWYW08YZEZA

By plugging this address into Clearsight (https://www.clearsight.space/), we can track its transactional footprint. The data reveals massive outflows, specifically a cumulative total of 6.9+ million STX sent directly to this address: :backhand_index_pointing_right: SP111MNWTSXGTD0ESMV59WX4KHQA93RTV9F82EK0K

This is kraken deposit address. So we might be in the scenario B.

5 Likes

Great tool for transparency and analytics.

This means we will never go back to a predictable rewards halving system? Also, how can we prevent from changing the protocol again and again regarding rewards?

Thank you.

1 Like

We stop changing when it works nicely. “Nicely” is still to be defined :slight_smile:

4 Likes

Yes, If we can survive long enough lol

For the change of emissions, coinbase reward back to 1000 STX, is there a separate report or blog post on the long term halving / emissions schedule to account for the chang @alexlmiller ?

The decision to eliminate the additional 500 STX boost in each block and just keep the long term adjustment of the coinbase reward back to 1000 STX.

Previously, we had a thorough report from the 7th Avenue Group Emissions schedule report January 2025

3 Likes

I want to make a proposal, because I think the disagreement here is narrower than the thread makes it look. The question isn’t whether to launch Bitcoin Staking. It’s whether to bundle a permanent monetary change with a demand thesis that hasn’t been tested yet.

The June 9 update may have already solved this. The Endowment-funded sBTC injection mechanism described for future boosts is a general tool. It adds BTC to the reward pool without touching consensus emissions and that’s the entire stated purpose of the coinbase restoration.

An alternative path could be to launch PoX-5 on the current SIP-029 schedule and cover the Tranche 1 gap with Endowment sBTC during bootstrap. At 500 per block the pool runs around 74 BTC a year at the prices in Appendix A3. A 1,500 BTC launch at 3% needs 45 of that, and getting to the 2x coverage target takes an injection on the order of 15 to 20 BTC a year. Low single-digit millions, well inside the budget @axopoa already laid out. Zero dilution. The partner still earns the same 3% self-custodial yield. And the network has been producing blocks fine at 500 since April, so the security case for restoring 1,000 is really a staking capacity case, which the injection covers.

Then put the permanent emission restoration to its own vote after a bonding period or two, with real data behind it. If the demand shows up, that vote passes easily and I’d support it. If it doesn’t, holders kept the schedule they were promised in SIP-029.

If the authors feel the restoration has to ship in this SIP, then make it provisional rather than permanent, along the lines of @friedger’s soft anchor. Revert automatically to the SIP-029 schedule after a defined number of bonding periods unless the program hits stated milestones. Bonded BTC beyond the whitelist, sustained coverage, fee growth. Emissions that are earned by demand arriving, not spent in anticipation of it.

This also seems strictly better for the proposal’s chances. The mechanism is genuinely novel and deserves a clean launch. Right now the most contested thing in this thread isn’t Bitcoin Staking, it’s the monetary change attached to it. Separate them and the vote gets easier.

@alexlmiller is there a reason the injection mechanism can’t carry the bootstrap?

In terms of whether the injection mechanism could cover the whole bitcoin staking rewards budget: it both understates how much is needed (it assumes only 1,500 at launch and doesn’t account for the future bonding periods that keep going every month), and in either case while the endowment has a very strong supply of STX, it does not have much BTC, so the only way to generate that would be to sell STX far in excess of what we’re comfortable with.

But the great part about this structure is that if the BTC demand isn’t there or we decied to stop issuing bonds, all the yield flows down to the STX only stakers, same as at is for the last few years.

So we either get the demand and associated growth of the ecosystem (which likely generates better rewards for stx only stakers in the long run), or the yield and operation looks like it has for the last few years.

1 Like

The BTC constraint makes sense, but it points at a simpler version of the same idea. The program doesn’t need the Endowment to hold BTC. It needs miners to have a reason to bid more BTC, and that reason is denominated in STX, which the Endowment holds in strong supply from the recent SIP 031 issuance.

So fund the increment with the asset the Endowment actually has. Two ways to do it.

Keep the SIP-029 schedule and stream the extra 500 per block to miners from the treasury through a rebate contract, along the lines @axopoa laid out. Miner rewards identical to the SIP. Bids identical. Market flow identical, since the SIP already assumes miners sell their coinbase same day.

Or, if the coinbase has to be the delivery mechanism for simplicity, mint the 1,000 as drafted and have the Endowment burn the 500 increment from treasury each period. That’s the burn-offset you raised yourself on June 5 for the boost, which got mooted when the boost was dropped before it was ever resolved. Net issuance stays on the SIP-029 path. No Endowment selling at all. Nothing about the staking mechanism changes.

On selling STX being beyond what you’re comfortable with: the SIP proposes minting 26M new STX a year for miners who, by its own modeling and the on-chain data upthread, sell it same day. The market absorbs the same flow either way. The only question is whether it comes from treasury supply that already exists or new supply that dilutes every holder. Discomfort with the first while proposing the second is the part I can’t square.

On scale, the rebate or burn only needs to carry the bootstrap. That was the proposal. If demand proves out, the permanent restoration goes to a vote with real data behind it and passes easily. The fixed 1,000 doesn’t scale with demand either. Past bootstrap, fees have to carry this program under both designs.

The failure cases aren’t symmetric. If demand doesn’t come under this path, the Endowment has spent a bounded line of its growth budget, which is what growth budgets are for. If demand doesn’t come under the SIP as drafted, holders carry a permanently doubled schedule with no product to show for it. Same as the last few years, at twice the emission, isn’t the same.

The question from my last post is still open. If the restoration ships in this SIP, is there a reason it can’t revert to the SIP-029 schedule automatically if the program doesn’t hit stated milestones?

2 Likes

+1 I would say Layer-2 chains like Stacks benefit from being more modifiable and fast-changing, compared to L1’s at least while they are have yet to settle on a primary use-case like bitcoin yield. Protocol immutability is an impediment for L2’s. The Stacks protocol should be as mutable as it needs to be to increase TVL and market-cap and make them long-term “sticky”.

Separately, I have seen that many in the community feel that Stacks’ design and team is not supportive of the value of the STX asset. If this is wrong, then there is a disconnect in communication… ie, I think the mechanics of this new Stacks blockchain “flywheel” design works and how it’s supportive of STX value is not very well understood. This, including things like the future possibility of STX token burning via protocol revenue, I think many people don’t know about. I think how this flywheel works, if successful, is obvious or intuitive to many of the Stacks team and institutional investors but less so to many community members and retail investors. And so because of this, they see mostly just the risks and near-term downsides.

2 Likes

My thoughts exactly. Tinkering and tinkering to get it nicely will make that the public doesnt even take Stacks seriously and it will end up failing. It would be better if the changes would be respected. I like Stacks, I have been a long time user and holder. But with this changes, I just say to myself, I will withdraw some funds in case the project “craps out“.

1 Like

Tinkering is an interesting way to describe blockchain development.
Was Ethereum tinkering when they completely changed their consensus algo from POW to POS? Was Stacks tinkering when v2.0 was released?

2 Likes

Great trace, @axopoa. Two things:

  1. Good to see the jBTC mining observatory + Clearsight combo surface this. Beyond forensics, the real value is understanding the market — turning on-chain flows into insights builders can actually leverage. I’d like to see it go deeper (Signal21 data layered in?) and ideally with free tiers for builders, so that intel is accessible to anyone shipping on Stacks.

  2. That 6.9M+ STX settling into a Kraken deposit address is exactly the kind of flow we’d love to give an on-chain option to. We’re building an OTC-style RFQ where MMs serve large swaps with KYB’d off-chain quotes, filled at Pyth ± a small premium — so a miner can get effectively their CEX quote without leaving Stacks, if they want to. No need to force anything: just offer programmable on-chain settlement and better privacy, and let the flow choose to stay native. If even part of these mining flows stay on-chain, that’s a real structural win. Check it out at Jing Swap, Swap big from Bitcoin to USDC on Stacks. WIP

2 Likes

I understand institutional investors have informed Stacks they are comfortable with a ~3% yield if it’s reliable/stable, and the current SIP (PoX-5) delivers what they’ve asked for—great.

But what is the durability of this value proposition? We don’t want to fall victim to the “Fallacy of Stated Preferences”—users unintentionally lying… Their preference comes from a bear-market mindset today. Will “we’re fine with 3% fixed” feel like being short-changed in a future bull market—when risk appetite returns and competing products offer potentially better upside participation?

I’m not suggesting we increase their cut of the rewards pie today at the expense of STX stackers. The bootstrap phase should remain stable and predictable.

However, I’m asking: should/can we design a parallel or future product—perhaps a "Growth Bond” vs “Stable Bond”—that gives them a base yield plus some upside participation tied to network growth? For example, a product that pays 3% fixed (floor) plus a share of Protocol Revenue (sBTC Tx fees?) above a certain baseline.

This way, in a bull market with higher usage, TVL, and fees, their yield rises with the network—without taking anything away from STX stackers today. It aligns institutional capital with Stacks’s long-term success and gives them a reason to stay rather than chase competing BTC yield products when the market turns.

This may be more appropriate for the PoX-6 algorithmic phase than the current PoX-5 bootstrap. But starting the conversation now might help explore how growth driven yield could be structured. Is there any consideration in the current roadmap for this kind of upside participation?

4 Likes

One last thing I want to point out is that it’s important to understand how most institutions will obtain the STX required to participate. Maybe I am missing something, but here is my thought process.

​As we know, one of the benefits of Bitcoin Staking is that it increases STX demand. In theory, this is true if institutions buy from the open market. This would create a substantial buying pressure that drives the price of STX up, while reducing the circulating supply due to the lockups and increasing the TVL. The price increase would logically push miners to bid more BTC, and stakers would get higher yields, creating a positive loop.

​But in practice, we know the Endowment needs to offload a substantial amount of STX to fund itself. According to SIP-031, they are doing this by offering attractive discounts on STX.

​If most of the large BTC stakers are buying or lending STX OTC from the Endowment to participate, it changes the market dynamics and reduces the impact of that positive loop. In fact, it can create a market asymmetry: institutions buy or lend OTC, but that STX eventually ends up being sold on the open market.

​For example, with the 2,000 BTC launch, that is around $128 million USD at current prices. Since institutions only need to buy 5% of that value in STX to participate, it represents $6.4 million in potential buying pressure; all of which could be entirely absorbed by the endowment OTC sales rather than hitting the open market.

This setup is fine for a ‘marketing’ push or a powerful initial launch, but in the long term, it will suppress a lot of genuine buying pressure.

3 Likes

Hi all, weighing in from my perspective as Governance CAB Chair and catching up with the latest on everything.

Ahead of casting my vote on SIP-045 (PoX-5: Bitcoin Staking and Emission Schedule Alignment), I ran a due-diligence pass across the source of record (PR #270), both forum threads, and the Governance CAB charter. I have attached the full write-up, organized as a general ecosystem review and a strict Governance CAB charter review. Please reuse any of it.

Short version: I am undecided. This is not a No and it is not a Yes. I broadly support the Bitcoin Staking mechanism, which has clear support across these threads. My questions are about the bundle assembled around it and a few loose ends I would like to see closed first.

A few things worth noting up front:

  • SIP-045 is effectively one vote on roughly nine changes. The Bitcoin Staking mechanism is well received; the contested pieces are the permanent coinbase restoration and the governance and process elements, and they all ride on a single up or down vote.
  • PoX-5 is the first step toward the larger vision in the whitepaper. PoX-6 would come later as its own SIP, so approving this does not approve that.
  • A couple of editorial loops are still open: the activation block heights are marked TBD, and the editor sign-off has not been recorded yet. These should be quick to close.

Open questions I would like to see addressed before I vote:

  • Can the pre-authorization vote’s companion specification (and a short summary of its earlier review) be posted for the community, or can element (f) be decoupled and ratified once that spec is final?
  • Can the open editor review be resolved and the activation block heights specified before the voting window closes?
  • Would the Economic CAB be able to weigh in on the coinbase change? It sits squarely in their mandate and is the most debated piece in the bundle. I understand the Foundation is already working to reach its members.
  • What is the case for making the emission change permanent now, rather than provisional with a defined reassessment? This comes about two months after SIP-029’s April step-down took effect.
  • The yield reserve starts empty, so the early zero-yield scenario Friedger modeled has little buffer at first. What is the plan for that early window?

I will keep my vote open until I have seen responses, and I am happy to be the last Governance vote in so these have a chance to be addressed. One practical ask: could we confirm the Governance CAB’s voting deadline against the already open community window, so I know the timing?

Genuine thanks to the authors for an ambitious proposal, and to the CAB and tooling folks moving the process forward. These questions are about getting the bundle and the loose ends right, not about the merits of Bitcoin Staking itself.

Sources: PR #270, main forum thread, whitepaper thread, voting site, Governance charter. Full analysis attached.

Jason (whoabuddy), Governance CAB

SIP-045 Due-Diligence Report_ Governance CAB Analysis.pdf (364.1 KB)

6 Likes