Great points.
We dont want to be the “better tech” that nobody uses. If you believe we finally have product-market fit, sip-031 deserves the attention and support.
If you don’t believe in sBTC, BTC Defi and Stacks has found PMF, then the question is how do we get there? What’s the alternative?
SIP-031 is our time to scale
It funds user acquisition, liquidity, and growth — not just more whitepapers.
Builders can focus on traction. Users get better products. The whole ecosystem benefits.
First I’d like to say we appreciate the daily actions and community participation you’re bringing to the SIP Alex.
Secondly, I like the proposed changes and clarification around the threshold and the potential for a burn — that kind of foresight definitely helps build confidence in the long-term for all stakeholders.
That said, I’m curious how we should think about the other side of that scenario. If STX underperforms, could that put the endowment in a difficult position, especially with USD commitments?
We don’t know when next bear market, but we don’t want the endowment to be forced to sell large portions of STX into a weak market — potentially creating additional downward pressure.
For example, would emissions pacing, ops runway, or capital deployment strategy be adjusted. Is it too early to think about this?
Open to thoughts here — should guidelines and/or some language around this planning be in place.
+1 to more community and content creators programs and funding. Awareness, distribution and user acquisition budgets should de in place, but with clear milestones and KPIs to support more creators and continue building a strong Stacks culture.
I do believe this an opportunity to grow the whole Stacks pie.
Supporting all types of builders contributing to the ecosystem growth and user acquisition.
I really appreciated the inclusive view of the ecosystem.
Personally, I see SIP-031 as a unique opportunity to grow the entire Stacks pie — not just through one lens, but by supporting all kinds of builders who are actively contributing to ecosystem growth, distribution, and long-term sustainability.
That said, I don’t believe we can achieve the scale needed to compete with other L1s/L2s — in marketing or product — without some degree of “alignment around a clear strategic vision”.
Hence the proposal of a dedicated CMO, Marketing and community funding, which can execute and deliver on the vision amd capabilities of the ecosystem, without causing additional bureaucracy and fragmented milestones.
To me, DeFi isn’t just DEXs or vaults — it includes marketplaces, trading rails, fees, swaps, memecoins, and the whole creator economy.
And this endowment is geared towards the scale of proven tech and defi rails that will support an even bigger creative community, plus RWAs, Gamefi, and of course AI.
The creative economy is DeFi and, if we look at how a many Stacks born or incubated apps (including NFTs builders, Wallets, NFT as collateral, and Marketplaces of this creative economy was able to quickly pivot and support Ordinals and Runes due great tech and private funding from VCs. In(Xverse, Satoshibles NFTs ,(OrdinalsBot), Rehab Resorts NFT (Liquidium), Asigna, Gamma and more).
So don’t think the analogy of Defi vs Everyone else makes the most sense. Many of these builders were originally NFT or Creative focused teams that built great products and raise VC funding to deliver strong tech execution leading yo the creation of culturally vibrant communities around their products — proof that creative energy and financial primitives are not mutually exclusive.
Now Imagine we had this endowment and the support to scale even faster where BTC Defi amd Stacks would be now.
Many of the new projects are following the same and slow process other defi builders endured, plus a bear market on top. Which is exactly what we proposed to change. It’s time we stop hiding and put our foot on the gas. Marketing is not free, listing is not free, user acquisition, security and scallabe infra requires funds.
To make it clear, I fully supported a dedicated budget towards community engagement and marketing, aligned with protocol goals, user acquisition and growth. That helps us build a culture that continues to attract incredible talented people.
+1
I would argue against this. The Stacks treasury after this SIP is already small compared to other ecosystems that have literally billions of dollars. Stacks has a history of limiting its growth through conservative choices, let’s not make that mistake again
If we say we need less money when STX price goes up, then it would logically follow that we also need a provision for more STX if STX price goes down - I wouldn’t go there
Also want to drop something here with regards to the comments about governance.
Governance isn’t a community Twitter poll. When you hold STX you’re making the same bet you make with startup equity - you’re backing the team. Muneeb and core contributors already have most of their net-worth, reputations, and careers tied to this token and ecosystem. That’s 100% skin in the game.
So let leadership execute. Micromanaging every grant or budget line just burns time, kills speed, and drags the whole ecosystem down. A nine-member Treasury Committee with guardrails is not ‘centralisation’, it’s operational reality.
This is my first time commenting on the Stacks Forum, but I’ve been building, experimenting, and believing in Stacks for over 5 years as the founder of SpaghettiPunk.
I truly love this ecosystem. The thoughtful debate around SIP-031 shows how strong and mature this community has become — in my view, it’s the most genuine and committed community in all of Web3.
We all know the tech is solid and only getting better — the minds are here, and the foundation is strong. But to reach the next level, we need to double down on growth. Funding has been limited for too long. It’s time to unlock a more ambitious path forward.
That said, I strongly support allocating a fair and proportional share of these funds to programs like DeGrants, which have proven their value in supporting grassroots projects, onboarding new users, and keeping the culture alive.
This isn’t core vs. community — we need both. SIP-031 is a powerful opportunity to scale the whole ecosystem, and it can become even stronger with broader inclusion.
Stacks is ready. The community is ready.
Now let’s grow — for real.
It’s STX szn! 
Nobody Left Behind — Community Centered Amendments to SIP-031
Authored by Binaya Tripathi (X handle : binaya_btc)in the collective “we” voice to capture concerns shared by builders, grassroots organizers, artists, educators, gamers, and other Stacks contributors. If these points reflect your view, please add your support in the forum thread.
SIP-031 outlines an ambitious plan to accelerate Stacks growth through a new Endowment and a nine-member Operations Entity (Ops Entity) responsible for ecosystem marketing, DevRel, liquidity programs, and more. We support professionalized execution and greater capital efficiency; however, the draft re-introduces familiar risks:
Our amendments preserve the strategic intent of SIP-031 while ensuring every layer of the builder pyramid is funded and heard.
Figure 1: Doughnut chart illustrating emissions breakdown with a 10 % slice labeled “Nobody Left Behind – DeGrants Community Fund.”
Figure 2: Updated org chart showing parallel arrows from the Stacks Endowment to (a) Ops Entity and (b) DeGrants Community Council, both reporting to the broader ecosystem, with the Stacks Foundation serving as governance anchor.
By adopting these modest safeguards, SIP-031 can fuel exponential Stacks growth without sacrificing the grassroots ingenuity that makes the ecosystem special. Let’s invest in our future and ensure nobody is left behind.
Correction to Reputational Risk
I was mistaking on my assessment of the mint and token supply. I blundered the fact that Stacks’ total supply had been reached. I was still looking at the 1.8B number and not the 1.5B. I’ve made the following updates to my previous post on reputational risks.
1. The initial mint can and most likely will be interpreted as “money printing” which is a taboo activity in crypto culture. It should be explicitly stated that the Stacks total supply is being increased as to not cause confusion In lieu of “created” a more accurate term could be “emitted” or “minted.” Regardless, this mint will be criticised and associated with centralized behavior, potentially attracting negative sentiment and media coverage.
2. There potentially may be short term price impacts due to dilution of current $STX holders. The tokenomics associated with raising the total supply are not included in the body of the SIP. Also the SIP does not address nor quantify the impacts to current token holders from dilution. The Nomiks report addresses various risks such as market sensitivity, survivability and feasibility however no mention of price depreciation due to dilution. The body of the SIP should provide a better summary, or series of summaries, regarding the Nomiks report.
@alexlmiller This is great work. Your commentary reads very closely to what the final SIP form will resemble. We’re getting close.
With a stronger emphasis on goals, risks and tokenomics (including addressing concerns and potential undesired outcomes) it gives the community more knowledge regarding the mission of the endowment and the tremendous amount of work thus far.
With knowledge comes power, and in this case power refers to building confidence in the community to rally behind this historic move.
I have been part of the Stacks community since 2018, having participated in the initial public token offering under Reg A+. Over the years, I have mostly observed and learned, occasionally contributing through blog articles and technical analyses. My intention has always been to support Stacks’ growth in the ways available to me and to help it gain the recognition it deserves as the most robust and resilient Bitcoin layer.
During the Blockstack era, I placed “Can’t Be Evil” stickers throughout my town in the Netherlands. That slogan captured a principle: decentralization, integrity, and resistance to unchecked power.
When SIP-031 was published, it immediately raised concerns. The proposal to mint and centrally allocate a large amount of new tokens feels at odds with those founding principles.
This is the first time I have felt compelled to respond publicly to a SIP. I chose to set emotion aside and engage with the proposal analytically. I read it in full and studied the accompanying Nomiks model carefully. While the goals are commendable, the implementation raises substantial questions across legal, economic and governance dimensions. Below is a structured analysis of my findings and concerns.
1. Legal and Regulatory Structure
The proposed structure introduces real regulatory risks. Minting and allocating tokens through a committee may resemble a securities offering under both US and EU law. This diverges from the original Reg A+ structure, which emphasized decentralized earning through mining.
Under MiCA (Regulation (EU) 2023/1114), the issuance and centralized distribution of new tokens may be classified as a crypto-asset with investment characteristics. This could trigger registration, AML and disclosure obligations, especially if the structure meets criteria for an ‘asset-referenced token’ or ‘significant crypto-asset’, based on scale and control.
In the US, this structure could be assessed under the Howey test[2], which determines whether a token distribution arrangement qualifies as an investment contract. While recipients do not contribute capital directly, the expectation of profit derived from the managerial efforts of a centralized committee may raise questions under the remaining prongs of the test. If interpreted broadly, this could still result in retroactive classification as a security, triggering SEC compliance obligations.
What is currently missing:
Introducing centrally controlled token flows without legal safeguards puts the whole ecosystem at risk.
2. Governance
SIP-031 envisions a Treasury Committee with control over potentially hundreds of millions of dollars in STX value. Yet there are no elections, no term limits, no audit mandates, and no on-chain ratification. Several stakeholders who may receive funding are also positioned to decide allocation. This creates structural conflicts.
Without enforceable checks and public accountability, power concentrates without recourse.
What should be added:
The proposal claims decentralization but lacks the structures that make decentralization meaningful.
3. Economic Architecture
The Nomiks report offers robust modeling, yet omits key transparency elements. Runway projections are based on STX price scenarios but there is no clear breakdown of circulating versus total supply, nor a public unlock schedule for the 100 million STX.
Findings from the model:
What is not addressed:
The proposal projects activity, not resilience. Without built-in return flows or feedback mechanisms, capital leaves the treasury with no structural path back.
4. Control and Framing
SIP-031 introduces centralized discretion over funding without mechanisms for participatory governance. There is no on-chain voting, no PoX-based decision-making, and no DAO approval structure. While these mechanisms may be technically feasible within the Stacks framework, they are not part of the current design.
Without structural input or feedback channels for STX holders, governance remains top-down and opaque. To truly align with decentralization principles, participatory mechanisms must be considered and integrated.
5. Suggestions and Questions
Some ideas came to mind as I reflected on potential ways to strengthen the sustainability and feedback design of the treasury. These are not grounded in technical certainty, but represent open questions worth exploring:
Without mechanisms for value to return, this remains a finite fund with a countdown, not a self-reinforcing treasury system.
Summary (TL;DR):
Final Thoughts
SIP-031 is ambitious and grounded in vision. The proposers clearly care about the future of Stacks and have invested time, energy and vision into designing a mechanism they believe is necessary for growth. Their willingness to take bold steps where stagnation might seem safer deserves recognition.
Still, when minting new tokens, centralizing funding power and asking the community to place its trust in a new structure, the design must be watertight. It must hold up legally, economically and institutionally. Good intentions are not enough.
As it stands, SIP-031 falls short on those fronts.
Without significant revision, I cannot support the proposal. Not because I oppose progress, but because the current approach risks undermining the very principles that have defined the Stacks ecosystem: decentralization, legitimacy and community accountability. Supporting this proposal in its current form would compromise those values rather than reinforce them.
To everyone who continues to build: thank you. I hope this response encourages further dialogue.
References
[1] Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA).
[2] SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), US Supreme Court.
[3] Securities Act of 1933, Regulation A (Reg A+), as amended.
[4] Based on modeling assumptions provided in the “Nomiks Analysis 5Y Plan Final” (2025), section 5.4.
[/quote]
Thank you @joeri.btc for your thoughtful and principled critique of SIP-031. It is rare to see such a clear articulation of the tension between visionary goals and the structural mechanisms used to pursue them. Your concerns are not only valid but deeply relevant. They point to an urgent need for a treasury model that upholds the foundational principles of the Stacks ecosystem, decentralization, integrity, and accountability, not just in language but in structure.
The individual allocation treasury model is a direct answer to the problems you identified. It does not revise the current structure of SIP-031. It replaces it entirely with a model rooted in user-level consent, decentralized allocation, and automated feedback mechanisms.
Below, I will respond to your critique point by point and show how this model solves or structurally prevents each of the issues you raised.
You are right to point out that SIP-031 introduces legal exposure by consolidating control over new emissions in a centralized treasury committee. This resembles the kind of discretionary allocation and managerial effort that can trigger securities regulation under the Howey Test and MiCA classifications.
The individual allocation model avoids these risks entirely.
There is no committee. There is no promise of profit. There is no pooling of capital under centralized discretion. Emissions are fixed or capped and are allocated proportionally to individual STX holders. Each participant must explicitly choose to either fund ecosystem categories or burn their share.
If no action is taken, funds are held in a neutral time-locked account for six months, after which they are distributed by smart contract through either a market-driven merit queue or public auction, both with transparent and non-custodial rules. No entity manages capital on behalf of others.
This structure eliminates any centralized managerial body, thereby removing the key legal elements that resemble a security or collective investment scheme.
You correctly note that SIP-031 introduces a powerful Treasury Committee with no term limits, no elections, and no enforced transparency. This is incompatible with decentralization.
The individual allocation model eliminates the need for governance over others’ funds. Each STX holder governs their own proportional share. No one votes on behalf of anyone else. No majority can override individual choice.
This eliminates the need for elections, term lengths, conflict of interest frameworks, or audits. Accountability is built into the design. If a proposal fails to gain support from individual allocators, it receives no funding. If a user disagrees with all options, they can burn their share entirely.
This is not governance. It is ownership.
Your economic critique of SIP-031 is essential. It shows how funding projections depend on assumptions about token price, behavior, and committee efficiency. The absence of defined unlock paths, emission caps, or feedback mechanisms leaves the system fragile and unpredictable.
The individual allocation model is emission-disciplined. Only the portion of the scheduled emission that is explicitly funded enters circulation. If 50 percent of STX holders fund initiatives and 30 percent burn their share, then only 50 percent of the emission is released into the market, and 30 percent is permanently removed from supply. The remaining 20 percent, from holders who take no action, is placed into a time-locked holding contract for six months. During that period, the original holders still have full control and may choose to fund or burn their share at any time.
If they fail to act by the end of that window, their unclaimed allocation is automatically repurposed through one of two structured, decentralized mechanisms:
Or
This design means that when users remain inactive, their capital is not frozen or lost, it is passed into the hands of those who have proven their commitment. Passive holders, by not acting, implicitly delegate their influence to active participants, who earn the right to help guide unused funds toward productive initiatives. The result is a treasury that never stalls, remains aligned with those who care enough to act, and reinforces growth through responsibility, not politics.
Here is a Diagram of how the individual choice treasury system looks
+------------------------+
| Annual STX Emission |
| (e.g., SIP-031) |
+-----------+------------+
|
v
+------------------+------------------+
| |
| STX Holder Proportional Share |
| (based on % ownership) |
+------------------+------------------+
|
+----------------------+----------------------+
| |
v v
+-------------------------+ +----------------------------+
| Choose Funding Targets | | Burn My Allocation |
| % to Dev, Marketing... | | -> Reduces supply |
+-----------+-------------+ | -> Prevents dilution |
| +----------------------------+
v
+----------------------------------------------+
| Funds Distributed via Smart Contracts |
| (Based on Individual Choices, Not Votes) |
+----------------------------------------------+
If No Action(funding or burning) is taking in 6 Months:
|
v
+--------------------+ or +----------------------+
| Merit Queue | | Public Auction |
| Based on Signaling | | STX bids are burned |
+--------------------+ +----------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------+
| Remaining STX is Burned |
+----------------------------+
You are absolutely right that SIP-031 lacks participatory mechanisms. There is no real path for STX holders to influence how capital is used beyond soft feedback or public discussion. It is a design of discretion, not distribution.
The individual allocation model inverts this entirely.
Every STX holder controls their share directly. You do not participate in a vote. You act. You decide whether to fund development, marketing, grants, or none. No majority can dilute your judgment. Your capital moves only with your consent.
This creates a truly decentralized treasury. Not one based on token-weighted elections or delegated committees, but on direct economic action. It introduces decentralization not just as an idea, but as the system’s core operating logic.
Your final point addresses something few treasury proposals confront honestly. Once the money is spent, where does it go? How is it recovered, recycled, or reinforced?
In the individual allocation model, no permanent capital commitment is made unless a user chooses it. Treasury capital cannot be wasted because it is never distributed without explicit support.
If a proposal fails to gain traction or meet its deliverables, it ceases to receive funding. If users stop allocating, emissions slow. If users burn their share, the circulating supply contracts. All of these are not exceptions but normal outcomes. They are how the system remains self-regulating.
In addition, both the merit queue and the auction are selective mechanisms. The merit queue only funds proposals that have active signaling support from users who have previously funded or burned. This rewards only builders with demonstrated backing. The auction requires bidders to burn STX to compete for access to unallocated funds. This converts potential waste into long-term value by reducing supply.
No central party can restart the process or override user disinterest. The system decelerates naturally when it fails to deliver value. That is how it stays resilient.
You are absolutely right to hold SIP-031 to the highest standards. The risks you describe, legal uncertainty, centralization of power, lack of accountability, fragile economics, and absence of structural feedback, are real. They do not just weaken the proposal. They threaten the legitimacy of the entire ecosystem if ignored.
The individual allocation model addresses these issues not by promising better governance, but by removing governance where it does not belong.
It does not ask anyone to trust a committee. It asks each participant to act.
The critics are not generalized. Stacks did already do a few things suggested there.
Setting up a DUNA or BORG would be amazing. This should be done in particular for deGrants. (Do we have a treasury that could fund this project? 
)
We have already experience with
This is going to change things in a major way for Stacks. I think that as long as builders on the ground floor are recognized and a fair portion of the endowment goes toward helping them, then things will be good.
My proposed draft is now posted on a new thread
Reduce Dilution from Proposed Emissions
I am in support of the general spirit of this SIP and the amendments being made. The additional emissions cause a significant amount of dilution for the existing STX investors. Nobody favors dilution but based on the evidence provided and general market direction, it appears necessary if Stacks wants to thrive in an environment where other projects are working with significant war-chests.
However, dilution should not be accepted as permanent, and strategies should be devised to reverse/minimize the effects of dilution created by the additional token emissions.
For example, there is already a mention of potential token burn once the Endowment reaches $1B USD which makes sense.
In addition, I recommend protocols and apps receiving liquidity from the treasury should also be required to share revenue with the Endowment on a predetermined schedule. Revenue sharing will create an additional source of funding for the Endowment and reduce reliance on future emissions. The details of every agreement can be customized but it is important to set the expectation that the Endowment money belongs to the broader STX community and it is the responsibility of the apps receiving liquidity to contribute to the sustainability of the Endowment.
Another option to reduce emissions would be to campaign Stackers to donate part of their Stacking revenue to the Endowment for a fixed period, say 1 or 2 years. Such an option can be built into StackingDAO and other stacking protocols so it’s conveniently available. This will enable the treasury to grow faster and reach a critical mass so future emissions can be reduced.
I encourage the broader community to suggest additional mechanisms that will help further reduce dilution.
Stacks was not created to compete with bitcoin’s monetary policy or token scarcity, so minting new STX tokens cannot be logically perceived as absolutely bad for the network. It might not work out, but it could be beneficial, because other networks, like Sui, have done something similar and succeeded.
Seems like we have two options, a) gamble with the current token supply, and hope that the Stacks network somehow gains traction without new funding, or b) dilute the supply by a small percentage, and give the community a higher chance of success in the long run. I would vote yes and hope for the best.